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Vol. XXXV, No. 898

September 10, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XXXV, No. 898 • PUBLICATION 6386

September 10, 1956

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25  
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1955).

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## The United Nations and American Foreign Policy

by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>

The United Nations has accomplished much despite severe handicaps which have hampered its full effectiveness since its founding.

Four of the basic assumptions upon which the United Nations Charter was drafted have so far proved erroneous.

The first assumption was that the great powers would continue to work together to win the peace as they had combined their might to win the war.

The second assumption was that peace treaties with the enemies would soon be concluded and the United Nations could function in a peaceful world. The task envisaged for the United Nations was to *maintain* peace—not to create it.

The third assumption was that reasonably prompt solutions could be found for the critical problems in the political and economic fields. Then the United Nations could concern itself primarily with the long-range problems of harmonizing the actions of nations and fostering international well-being.

The fourth assumption was that future wars, if they occurred, would imperil the world no more than past wars. For the charter was drafted without the knowledge of and actual experience with atomic and nuclear weapons.

Since these basic assumptions have all proved, at least in part, erroneous, it is perhaps remarkable that the United Nations has done as well as it has—or indeed that it has survived at all.

Despite these handicaps, the United Nations has a positive record of accomplishments:

It has settled a good many important disputes;

It has served as an invaluable center and a great stimulus for international cooperation;

It has stopped aggression in Korea and by so doing may have prevented world war III;

It has effectively exposed the diabolical nature of international communism, and the dangers inherent in it, by revealing the disparity between Communist claims and Communist actions.

The United Nations has been in operation only a little more than 10 years. We cannot now and we do not in the future expect it to solve all our world problems. It is not a panacea; it is not a cure-all or a remedy for all the world's ills. On the other hand, the machinery of the United Nations is not seriously defective. The charter has in fact proved to be a very flexible document which if properly used by the member states can substitute the conference table for the battlefield.

### Role of Secretary-General

The role of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in the Arab-Israeli dispute is a case in point. It is not possible, at this time, to predict the final outcome of his efforts. During the past few months, however, he has made a valuable contribution toward the easing of tensions in the area and avoiding the possible outbreak of war. His role demonstrates once again the fact that the charter contains many resources for peace—including his techniques of direct and quiet diplomacy—which have not yet been fully tapped.

In appraising the work of the United Nations we ought to keep in mind one simple fact. A great many important and difficult problems are resolved outside the organization. But the really

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the American Bar Association at Dallas, Tex., on Aug. 28.

tough ones, the well-nigh insoluble ones, come to the United Nations. It is, in a way, the court of last appeal.

### **The Suez Canal Problem**

This reference to the Near East brings to mind the grave situation created by Egypt's move to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. I do not need to tell you that our Government has been exerting every effort to find a peaceful solution to this difficult problem.

Now, some people have expressed concern that the Suez Canal problem was not turned over to the United Nations. Why, they ask, was there a 22-nation conference in London, rather than a U.N. meeting?

The answer to this question is that the London conference was held in full conformity with the U.N. Charter. Article 33 of the charter admonishes the parties to a dispute to seek, first of all, a solution by negotiation or other peaceful means of their own choice.

In this spirit, the London conference was convened. And in the same spirit, provision has been made to insure that the U.N.'s facilities for peace will be made available. On August 2, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, for his part, suggested that it would be perfectly natural for the U.N. to play an appropriate role in resolving this issue. And now, following the London meeting, there is agreement among the majority of affected nations on a number of possible relationships with the U.N.

Secretary Dulles' London proposal, which is now the majority proposal,<sup>2</sup> provides that the projected Suez Canal Board would be associated with the U.N. in an appropriate way. It would make periodic reports to the U.N. The International Court of Justice would be asked to name an arbitral commission to resolve some of the questions that might arise. And finally, any use or threat of force to interfere with free navigation of the canal would be treated as a threat to the peace and a violation of the U.N. Charter.

Now, of course the details have yet to be worked out, and doubtless there will be changes in the proposals. There is by no means full agreement as of now between the parties. But I want to assure you that no avenue is being overlooked in the search for a peaceful and acceptable solution to

this problem. This is our solemn obligation, and the obligation of all other governments under the charter of the United Nations.

We know that the task of doing well in peace is a vitally more difficult and complex task than that of doing well in war. This is the challenge we must meet if man is to survive in the atomic age.

The United Nations is one of the more important mechanisms available to us for meeting this challenge. We may be sure that the Soviet Union is well aware of the usefulness of the United Nations as a way of influencing world public opinion. They may change their tactics, but we can assume that they will continue to use the United Nations as a propaganda platform while pursuing unchanged behind the scenes their objective of spreading the influence of communism by subversion or threat of aggression.

### **U.S.S.R. and the Specialized Agencies**

The United States and the free world must not permit them to use the United Nations for their own ends. We must, therefore, continue to strengthen our support for the United Nations and the specialized agencies. You cannot win the cold war by retiring from the battlefields. I cannot agree, for instance, with those who argue that Soviet membership in such specialized agencies as the International Labor Organization or the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization will mean Communist domination or corruption of these agencies. After all, the Soviet Union and its satellites are a very small minority in the membership of these agencies. It is unthinkable that the free countries by default would let a minority group dominate or corrupt the high purposes for which these agencies were established.

Looking to the future, we need to understand better the work of the United Nations—its potentialities and its limitations. We must not be misled by those few who think that somehow the United Nations is a superstate which is threatening our sovereignty. Nothing could be further from the truth. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign states. It has no power to levy taxes or to make treaties. It has power to draft treaties, if the members wish to do so, but it is up to each state to decide by its own constitutional process whether to accept them. In our case, this calls for a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 3, 1956, p. 373.



In plotting our future course in the United Nations, I submit that we should adhere to the following principles and objectives:

We shall live up to the principles and purposes of the charter and refrain from the use of force in settling our disputes with other nations;

We shall encourage the concept of collective security so that nations which wish to remain free may stand together against any threat of aggression;

We shall continue with all our ingenuity and ability to solve that most complex and urgent of all world problems—adequate, safeguarded disarmament;

We shall support, in cooperation with other countries, the social and economic goals of the U.N. Charter;

We shall make every effort to develop a body of world opinion based on moral principles which will make peace the accepted law of relations among nations;

We shall demonstrate to the uncommitted nations of the world the enduring values of democracy and freedom.

If, as a nation, we follow this course in the United Nations, then I believe we can face the future with confidence that freedom with peace will prevail.

## Significance of London Conference on Suez Canal

### *Statement by President Eisenhower*

White House press release dated August 29

I have just received from Secretary Dulles a full report upon the London Suez conference. This supplements the daily messages which I received from him while he was in London.

It is, I think, of great significance that 18 of the 22 nations assembled in London, the shipping of which represents over 95 percent of the traffic through the Suez Canal, have agreed upon conditions which in their opinion are indispensable to give confidence that this waterway, international-

ized by the treaty of 1888, will be operated so as dependably to serve its appointed purpose.<sup>1</sup>

I am glad that President Nasser is prepared to meet to discuss this program.

This program was conceived in an atmosphere of friendly conciliation and, in my opinion, ought to rally behind it the support of all the nations and peoples that believe in the processes of international justice and conciliation.

The United States Government and, I believe, the American Nation completely support the 18-nation proposal thus arrived at in London, which, fully respecting the sovereignty of Egypt, would assure a peaceful solution of this great problem.

## Letters of Credence

### *Costa Rica*

The newly appointed Costa Rican Ambassador, Gonzalo J. Facio, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower August 30. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 460.

### *Sudan*

The newly appointed Sudanese Ambassador, Ibrahim Anis, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower August 31. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 462.

<sup>1</sup> At his news conference on Aug. 31 the President referred to "an apparent misunderstanding that has arisen about my use of the word 'internationalize' with respect to the Suez Canal." He then stated: "We are, I think, talking at cross-purposes. I referred to the Suez Canal as a waterway internationalized by the treaty of 1888. That treaty gives many nations rights in and to the canal in perpetuity. Now, of course, that does not mean that these nations own the canal. It does mean that under the treaty Egypt cannot now or in the future jeopardize those rights of other nations. Therefore, in the sense of the usage of the canal, it is internationalized. Now, in the formal statement of 2 days ago, I expressed the hope that the 18-nation proposal would prove acceptable to all concerned, and in that statement I noted specifically that the proposal fully respected the sovereignty of Egypt."

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 450 dated August 28

*Q. Mr. Secretary, while you were in London, there were reports that when you went and met with Minister Shigemitsu of Japan you discussed the territorial question as involved in a Japanese treaty with Russia. Could you tell us something about your views of that treaty?*

A. Well, this is at the moment primarily a matter between the Japanese Government and the Soviet Union. The Japanese Foreign Minister told me about the problems that they had encountered at Moscow and the reason why they had discontinued, temporarily at least, the negotiations—because of a difference of opinion about the territorial clause. But he was reporting the developments to me more than anything else.

*Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you were quoted in some reports as saying that, if Japan recognized the Soviet claims of sovereignty over the Kuriles, it might open the way for United States demands for sovereignty over other islands, particularly Okinawa.*

A. I pointed out to the Japanese Government—as a matter of fact, we had done it before I met with Mr. Shigemitsu in London—that there was an article, article 26, of the treaty which did contain a provision that if a treaty was made with another government on terms more favorable than the Japanese peace treaty which we had signed then we would be entitled to claim comparable benefits. That clause was put in the treaty—I wrote the treaty very largely, as you may remember—for the very purpose of trying to prevent the Soviet Union from getting more favorable treatment than the United States got. I merely reminded the Japanese of the existence of that clause. I did not attempt to indicate what its operation would be or that in fact it would be invoked. I merely pointed out that there was such a clause.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Suez Canal matter, would you regard as an acceptable substitute of*

*the London plan<sup>1</sup>—or as a variation which would be acceptable—a plan which would leave the canal in the physical control of Egypt but would have Egypt offer guaranties of freedom of navigation to countries using the canal, either individually or collectively?*

A. Well, the canal has been physically in the control of Egypt for some little time, particularly since the British withdrew from the Suez base. The canal is in Egyptian territory. That fact is not disputed. Now, the question of what arrangements about operations would be satisfactory is not primarily a question for the United States to answer. The United States is not dependent to any appreciable degree at all upon the Suez Canal. Its ships use the canal, but the United States economy is not dependent upon the canal. The economy of a number of other countries is vitally dependent upon the canal, and it is primarily for them to have an opinion as to what arrangements would in fact restore confidence so that their economies could go on being dependent upon the canal. As I say, that is not a matter which is primarily of United States concern but primarily of concern to the many countries—about 20—whose economies are vitally dependent upon the canal. We did get the expression of views of most of those countries at the London conference, and those views are being presented to President Nasser within the next day or two.<sup>2</sup>

*Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, your view I would imagine would be very important, especially in view of the role that you took in London. Could you give us your personal view on whether collective or individual guaranties would be satisfactory?*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 3, 1956, p. 373.

<sup>2</sup> A committee headed by Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies and including representatives of Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden, and the United States was selected to present the 18-nation proposals to the Egyptian President. The group held its first meeting with President Nasser at Cairo on Sept. 3.

A. I don't think that question can be answered, or ought to be answered, in the abstract. You have to break this problem down into its ingredients. You have certain practical problems of operation. You have the question of pilots—who has the right of hiring and firing the pilots; who determines the traffic pattern for passage through the canal—that is a very important aspect of the matter. Just as in the case of a busy airfield, the question of the competence of, and impartiality of, the man in the tower who makes the pattern of traffic in, particularly on a bad day—that is a position of great responsibility; so, similarly, the question of the pattern of traffic through the canal is a great responsibility. Then there is the question of who has the responsibility of keeping the canal properly dredged so that the sand doesn't fill it in. When you begin to think of the thing in terms of its detailed ingredients, then I think the problem does become soluble; at least I certainly hope so.

I don't think it's necessary to think of the problem in terms of these very great issues, these great slogans, such as the slogans of "nationalism versus internationalism," or "nationalism versus colonialism," or "Asia versus Europe," or any such things. Then the problem becomes almost insoluble. But when you begin to think of the concrete practical things you have to do to establish confidence that there will be an impartial, competent, and efficient operation of the canal, then I think the matter should be soluble. I don't say it will be, but I think it should be.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think President Nasser's decision to receive this committee and hear its report on the London conference is a contribution to making the problem soluble?*

A. I believe that it is. There was no sense of certainty, when our London conference adjourned, that he would see the delegation that the conference designated to talk with him. Now he has accepted that. We move forward, I think, steadily. And while the end is not yet in sight, I do believe that the steps which have been taken indicate a certain desire on both sides to reach a peaceful solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether Nasser is in a position to make a solution of this problem, a fair and nonwarlike solution?*

#### Propaganda by Soviet Union

A. Well, your question raises a point which I would like to comment on, which is the fact that, whereas most of the countries—I would say all but one of the countries—at the London conference were really trying to find the way to a peaceful and fair solution, there was an exception, and that is the Soviet Union. Almost throughout the entire conference it was carrying on an extreme form of propaganda through its Arab-language radio in Egypt, designed to make it extremely difficult for President Nasser to accept even a fair solution. That propaganda was, in effect, saying to the Egyptian people: Any solution that comes out of the London conference is colonialism, is imperialism, and if you accept it you will have subordinated Egypt again to the colonial rule which you have thrown off.

Now, that was a very vicious type of propaganda. It was being carried on while this conference was in session. On the very morning I was talking with Mr. Shepilov and explaining our plan to him, already the Soviet propaganda was denouncing the plan. At that time the plan had not yet been even presented to our conference, but was being denounced as "imperialism" and "colonialism." Obviously the effect of that, presumably the intended effect, was to make it as difficult as possible for President Nasser to accept. Nevertheless, I do believe that President Nasser has a sufficient influence and authority to accept a fair plan. I believe the 18-nation plan, in its general outlines, is fair and that that can be made even more apparent if it is worked out in terms of practical details as I just indicated in answer to a preceding question. So I'm not at all hopeless about the situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the Suez crisis would have developed if we had not withdrawn our offer of aid for the Aswan Dam?*

A. Yes, I feel that it's quite demonstrable that it would have developed in any event. While President Nasser indicated that the precise timing of his action to nationalize the Suez Canal Company was influenced by the Aswan Dam matter, he also has said that he had been thinking about it, planning for it, for over 2 years. And I feel quite confident that it would have happened in any event. Indeed President Nasser did not, and does not, attempt to justify his action on the

ground of the withdrawal of aid to the Aswan Dam. That would indeed be a very feeble ground upon which to justify it. He justifies it as a step in his program of developing the influence of Egypt, what he calls the "grandeur" of Egypt, and as a part of his program of moving from "triumph to triumph." He puts it on these broad grounds and says he himself has been studying it for over 2 years.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the press of Egypt said President Nasser was quoted as saying yesterday in Cairo that he was astonished at an alleged comment by yourself that the Constantinople convention had given an international character to the Suez Canal. Without undertaking to answer, would you care to dilate for our benefit on the meaning of "international" in that connection?*

A. Well, the Suez Canal was, of course, built before Egypt was an independent state, when it was still a part of the Ottoman Empire, and at that period it was internationalized by the treaty of 1888, which provides that it shall be a waterway freely open in time of peace and war to the traffic of all of the nations. That treaty was signed by the nations at that time principally interested in the canal and constituting the then "great powers" of the world. It was open for adherence by all countries of the world. I did not realize that there was any question but what the Suez Canal was an internationalized waterway.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there is some confusion as to whether ex-President Truman at Potsdam offered to internationalize the Panama Canal. I believe his memoirs state that he did and others that were present said that he did not make such an offer. Do you remember whether such an offer was made?*

A. I think that I can say that as far as the records disclose, and they have been very thoroughly examined—in fact, I have examined them myself—there was no such offer made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, was Israel's right of passage through the Suez in any way discussed at the London conference?*

A. Yes, that question did come up, and it was pointed out that Egypt is in defiance, really, of a decision by the Security Council of the United Nations, taken in 1951,<sup>3</sup> I think, which was re-

affirmed again, I think, in 1953, that under the terms of the treaty of 1888 the Israeli shipping was entitled to go through and that Egypt was not entitled to bar it as it was doing.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may we go back to Okinawa? How can we defend Formosa and the free Far East countries without Okinawa? Can you do it from the Philippines or back from the mid-Pacific?*

A. Who is suggesting that we should not hold it?

*Q. If we do not keep—do you intend to keep Okinawa, regardless?*

A. Well, we intend to exercise our rights in Okinawa so long as we consider that there is danger to international peace and security in the Asian theater. No doubt about that. I am curious to know what prompts your question. Did you think that there was any doubt or is there doubt in anybody's mind about it?

*Q. Yes, sir.*

A. All right, I hope what I have said dispels the doubt.

#### Possible Evolution of OAS

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back a little farther, you accompanied President Eisenhower to the Panama conference, at which the President suggested the formation of an inter-Presidential committee of all the delegates, of all the Latin American Presidents, to meet in Washington for economic development—*

A. Yes.

*Q. Are you in touch with Dr. Milton Eisenhower, or do you plan to confer with him prior to this meeting which will take place next month here?*

A. Yes. The meeting, I think, is called about the 17th of September, if I remember the date.<sup>4</sup> Yes, I do expect to be in touch with him.

*Q. Could you tell us what you hope this meeting will bring about?*

A. Well, the meeting will be the meeting in which I hope the group will take form, which President Eisenhower suggested and which will study the possible evolution of the Organization of American States in terms of greater social and

<sup>3</sup> For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 479.

<sup>4</sup> For text of U.S. note concerning the meeting, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1956, p. 356.



economic activity. It is the same kind of process, you might say, that is under way in relation to the NATO Organization. In both organizations there is a feeling that changing conditions have given an opportunity to have these organizations serve broader purposes than has heretofore been the case. In the case of the NATO Organization, there is this group at work, pursuant to the resolution which I proposed last May, on which Senator George is working very actively. They are studying how to bring about an evolution of the NATO Organization along broader lines. Similarly, there is this group which will be studying how to bring the Organization of American States into greater service in the light of the developments of our time.

Now, this group that will be formed here will not be a permanent group. It is a group which is to study how the Organization can better serve, and after it has made its recommendations, and if it is adopted by the governments concerned, then I assume that the work from then on would be carried forward by the OAS and its agencies. This present group is, in a sense, not a part of the Organization of American States but is a group of people designated by the governments to put their mind on how to develop the OAS somewhat more broadly.

#### **Problems Relating to Suez Canal**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, some Egyptian authorities have expressed alarm over what they regarded as a plot on the part of Britain and France to pressure or to suggest that their pilots quit the Suez Canal. Do you know of any such plot, or do you have any fears that the Western Europeans who are pilots at the canal will walk out?*

A. Well, there is no doubt but what there is unrest and some disorganization among the pilots. To what extent that is due to a political influence, I do not know. But the very fact that Egypt suggests that it may be due to political influence indicates precisely the problem that we face there, namely, that in an operation as sensitive as that, there ought not be a situation where, as a result of political influence, pilots get "diplomatic" sickness. Now it may be—I don't know whether it is or not, but at least Egypt suggests—that these pilots who are getting sick all of a sudden get sick because it is intimidated by their governments or

sources close to their governments that it is better for them not to turn up for duty.

What we want to do for the future is to have an operation of the canal where these vital, critical points, such as the pilots, their competence, their performance of duty, the pattern of traffic, and so forth, are divorced from the political policies of any government. If it is bad that that influence should in the past have been exerted by Britain and France, it does not make it any better to have it exerted for the future by another government.

As I said in London, the purpose ought to be to insulate the operation of this canal in its technical aspects from the political policies of any state, and, if the canal has, as charged, been subject to the political policies of Britain and France in the past, you don't correct that wrong by merely reproducing it in another form. It ought for the future to be free from the political influences of any government, and then and only then will it dependably serve its purpose as a great international waterway.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, what role do you see for the United Nations?*

A. Well, we believe and indeed suggested in our plan that we put forward in London that whatever the agency or board, whatever you want to call it, is which has these responsibilities in charge, it should be connected with the United Nations. Now, we did not attempt in our paper there to go into the precise nature of the connection. Some have suggested that the membership ought to be chosen by the United Nations, perhaps by the Security Council or perhaps by the General Assembly; others have felt that the connection should be limited to making a report and getting suggestions. But the concept of making the operation of this great international waterway something as to which the United Nations does have a measure of responsibility, that concept was in the proposal which we made; and I think that that aspect of it certainly would also be acceptable to the Indians and the Indonesians and the Ceylonese who did not go along with our proposal in all of its details. But their Governments were sympathetic to many of the aspects of our proposal.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to what you said earlier about the Soviet attitude and activity toward the Suez problem, do you find evidence since your return that the Soviet Union is trying to pre-*

vent a settlement, trying to frustrate these negotiations?

A. Well, I don't like to make charges about the motives of other people. But there is a legal doctrine which says that "a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts." I think that perhaps this is a situation where that legal dictum is applicable.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the State Department yet received any further information on the loss of the American plane off the coast of China to indicate that the Communist Chinese shot it down? And, secondly, if it has or has not, does the State Department plan to issue any statement concerning the loss of that plane?*

A. I think that a statement will be issued—whether by the State Department or by the Defense Department, I don't now know—as soon as the relevant data is all in and has been evaluated. We have communicated with the Chinese Communist regime through diplomatic channels and do have a reply from them which indicates their belief—if you take it at its face value—their belief, at least, that a plane that they shot down in that area, which they admit having shot down, was a Chinese Nationalist plane.<sup>5</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back for a moment to the Suez, if I am correct, in your statements today you didn't use the term "internationalization" of the operation. Is there any change whatsoever on this question in the United States attitude?*

A. I am not sure that I used the word "internationalization." If I did not use it, it was because perhaps instinctively I was trying to follow the advice which I gave earlier of trying to avoid using these grandiose terms which create conflicts which are perhaps unnecessary. Certainly, I did, I think, say that basically the canal is internationalized by the treaty of 1888.

Now when you go to the question of what are the essential operating functions, how do you assure that those functions are performed in an efficient and impartial way free from the political influence of any government—then you may get a result which some people may call "international operations," and other people may prefer not to call it that. I think it is better to think of these things in terms of what you actually do.

<sup>5</sup> For a joint State/Defense statement and correspondence between British and Communist Chinese authorities, see p. 412.

Now you have got the United Nations at New York. I don't suppose anybody would claim that, because of our arrangement with the United Nations, the city of New York has been "internationalized." We don't exercise a voice on who are the janitors, and what not, who perform the functions in the buildings there of the United Nations. We don't think that is in any respect a derogation of our sovereignty; it is merely a practical problem. The Secretary-General has certain responsibilities which he exercises there, and we consider them entirely compatible with the full sovereignty and dignity of the United States. We don't get into these great terms about whether or not we have "internationalized" and given up our "sovereignty" over a vital portion of New York territory. And I think if you can get this problem down, as I say, to terms of the concrete, practical things, and get away from these big terms which raise issues of a psychological and prestige character, we are much more apt to get to a solution.

#### Communication From Chinese Communists

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us through what diplomatic channels you have contacted the Chinese Communists on the plane?*

A. I believe that this particular contact was through the United Kingdom, which represents our interests in Communist China.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what we got from the Chinese Communists—was that something like a note addressed to us, or was it an informal kind of an oral exchange?*

A. It was a communication which they made. I don't actually recall whether it was a written or an oral communication to the British Minister. I only saw it myself an hour before coming down here. It just got in late yesterday, I believe.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did they concede that a plane was shot down, and do they say that so far as they know it was a Chinese Nationalist plane?*

A. They concede that a plane was shot at in that general area at about that time. They say that the plane that they shot was, they believed, a Chinese Nationalist plane.

*Q. They admit that the Chinese Communist Air Force did shoot down a plane?*

A. That's correct.



*Q. Any survivors? Any information on that question?*

A. Apparently, so far as we know, no survivors.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is this Soviet propaganda campaign on Egypt—is it still going ahead, or has it been relaxed somewhat toward the end of the conference? Because you did speak of what they did during the conference.*

A. My information up to yesterday is that it was still going ahead, yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the plane doing over there—the plane that was shot down?*

A. Our plane?

*Q. Yes.*

A. There is apparently a routine patrol flight which goes back and forth at quite regular intervals between Okinawa and Japan and swings in a semicircle, to keep track of the shipping and the like in that area. That will all be more fully explained when we finally agree on the evaluation of all of the facts.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to have arisen in Panama some area of misunderstanding between that Government and ours as to what the Panama treaty does. I wondered if you could comment on that situation?*

A. I'm not aware of any misunderstanding, at least at the official level. There has been a good deal of speculation as to possible similarities between the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. Actually, the situation is totally dissimilar in two vital respects. First, the juridical, the legal aspect of the problem. The Suez Canal by the treaty of 1888 is internationalized. The Panama Canal is a waterway in a zone where, by treaty, the United States has all the rights which it would possess if it were the sovereign "to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority." And there is no international treaty giving other countries any rights at all in the Panama Canal except for a treaty with the United Kingdom which provides that it has the right to have the same tolls for its vessels as for ours.

Now the second aspect of the matter, which is totally different, is the practical situation. In the case of the Suez Canal a large number of countries,

whose very livelihood almost depends upon the free and efficient and impartial operation of the canal, are in fact gravely disturbed because they fear that there will not be that kind of operation and that their lifeline—and to them it is almost literally a lifeline—that their lifeline may be cut. As far as I am aware, no country anywhere in the world fears that its economy is jeopardized by possible misuse, abuse, of our rights in the Panama Canal.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the plane, I believe you said that they concede a plane was shot down. Do they say that Red Chinese planes did shoot this plane down; that it was a plane of their own which did the firing?*

A. I think that's the inference, yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to be clear on this one point because of a technical difficulty with what they said in their broadcast about last Friday [August 24], which was to the effect that a Chinese Nationalist plane had been fired on by their fighter craft and damaged. They did not at that time say that the plane had been shot down, and I just wanted to confirm the idea that they conceded having shot down the plane.*

A. Well, now you are raising a point, frankly, that I did not have in my mind when I answered the preceding questions. I do not recall with sufficient accuracy the memorandum that we got—as I say, only a few hours ago—as to whether they still say they merely shot at it and hit it or whether they know they shot it down. I assume that by now they would not dispute the fact that it was shot down, because the debris has been found and a body has been found.

*Q. When you said in your statement before that there were apparently no survivors, then you are basing that on American evidence rather than on anything that was contained in this note?*

A. Except that the note is entirely negative with respect to survivors.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on July 26 Colonel Nasser said that an American official had told him not to pay any attention to a message that Mr. Allen was bringing him from you. Have you any information on that allegation?*

A. No.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## Senator George Leaves on NATO Mission

Press release 456 dated August 30

Senator Walter F. George of Georgia, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, left Washington for New York by train on August 30. He will sail from New York on August 31. Senator George will land at Southampton on September 5 and will visit London before going to Paris. In London he will see Sir Anthony Eden and other British statesmen.

On September 10 Senator George will go to Paris to participate in the NATO meetings. While in Paris he will see the French Prime Minister. Senator George will meet with the senior representatives of the other member governments of NATO who will come to Paris for the meetings.

Early in October Senator George will visit the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy before returning to the United States, sailing from Naples on October 16. On his return to the United States Senator George will report to the President and to the Secretary of State the results of his consultations in Europe.

At the ministerial meeting in Paris in May, the NATO member governments reached a decision to explore the possibilities of closer cooperation in political, economic, and cultural fields with the view to strengthening the ties of the North Atlantic Community.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Ministers designated a committee of three (Lester B. Pearson, Canada; Gaetano Martino, Italy; Halvard Lange, Norway) to study the problems and make a report to be considered at the December meeting of the Ministers. On May 8, immediately following the action taken by the Ministers, the President announced that he had asked Senator George to act as his personal representative and special ambassador to advise him on these developments.<sup>2</sup>

The ministerial committee of three has circulated a questionnaire to the member governments to ascertain their views, and they will hold meetings in Paris from the 11th through the 22d of September to discuss the answers which the member governments have made to this questionnaire. The United States delegation for these discussions will consist of Senator George, Ambassador George W. Perkins, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, and Julius

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 21, 1956, p. 836.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 28, 1956, p. 879.

C. Holmes, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for NATO.

## Chinese Communist Attack on Navy Patrol Plane

### JOINT STATEMENT BY DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE

Press release 464 dated August 31

The Department of State and Department of Defense make the following joint statement with regard to the loss of the Navy patrol plane off the Chushan Islands which reported itself as under attack the night of 22 August. The following facts have been established. The airplane was engaged in a routine patrol flight originating in Japan. The planned flight track covered the lower portion of the Yellow Sea and thence in general parallel to the China Coast well off shore and over international waters and thence eastward to Okinawa. The entire flight was planned to cover a period of approximately 6½ hours. Position reports received from the airplane during the flight indicated that the navigator calculated that the plane was on its planned track. The last position report received from the airplane was made at 11:45 p.m. local time, 22 August, 4½ hours after its departure. It showed a position substantially on the planned track and 38 miles distant from the nearest land held by the Chinese Communists. Forty minutes following his last position report, the plane commander reported briefly that he was under attack. No further reports were heard from the airplane.

Search and rescue operations were initiated by the Commander of the Seventh Fleet utilizing surface craft and aircraft of the Seventh Fleet and Air Force aircraft from shore bases. The initial point for the search was the projected position based on the last position report of the airplane and the flight plan on which it was flying. The search in this vicinity proved unproductive; accordingly, the standard naval search procedure for a downed airplane was used. The search ranged back along the plane's planned track—to the northward so that no reasonable possible locations would be left uncovered.

Following Peiping's broadcast that a Red Chinese plane had damaged a "Chiang Kai-shek"

plane near the Chushan Islands, the search was centered in this area. After about 31 hours of this kind of search—concentrating on what was the most probable center, but ranging backward along the projected track—aircraft of Task Force 77 of the Seventh Fleet, at 9:22 a.m., local time, on 24 August, reported sighting wreckage and rafts in international waters to the eastward of the Chushan Islands. The United States Destroyer *Dennis J. Buckley* proceeded at once, found the wreckage, and recovered the body of one of the aircraft crew, two empty life rafts, two fuel tanks, and one airplane wheel. The wreckage was identified as being that of the missing airplane.

A vigorous and all-out search of the area for possible survivors of the aircraft was continued in the area in which the wreckage was found. Instructions to aircraft making the search provided that no aircraft approach closer than three miles to land, thus keeping the search over international waters. The search for survivors was continued with negative results until 11:25 a.m., local time, 25 August, at which time the Commander of the Seventh Fleet ordered the search discontinued, feeling that all possibilities of picking up survivors had been exhausted. However, the Navy Department directed that the search not be discontinued but suspended until further orders in order that the situation might be fully evaluated. The location of the recovery of the wreckage determined the general location at which the aircraft was shot down and this area was left under surveillance by surface ships and aircraft in an effort to recover additional bodies. All naval surface and air forces involved in the search remained in the general area.

At 5:25 p.m. local time on 29 August the United States Destroyer *Taussig* located and picked up the body of another member of the crew of the missing aircraft. Search operations were reinstituted the next morning and have continued since. Small vessels are being brought in to assist.

There can be no doubt that the airplane reported by Peiping Radio as having been attacked by Chinese Communist aircraft is the ill-fated missing P-4-M aircraft. The discrepancy between the last position report received from the airplane and the position in which the wreckage was found is indicative of possible errors in navigation and the possibility cannot be excluded that the plane might, by navigational error, have passed over or

near one of the small islands lying about 37 miles to the east of the China mainland. However, the position of the elements found from the plane indicates that the actual attack took place over international waters.

On August 25, 1956, the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping, at the request of the Department of State, inquired of the Chinese authorities whether they had any information on the fate of the aircraft or any survivors of it.

A reply has now been received which states that a plane, which the Chinese authorities say they believed to be a Chinese Nationalist plane, was attacked near the Ma-an and Chengtze Islands lying about 44 miles East of China mainland at about the time of the attack in question. The Chinese Communist authorities say that if the plane turned out not to be a Chinese Nationalist plane but a United States naval aircraft, they could not but express great regret. Also they say that the aircraft was in fact violating Chinese territorial air and territorial sea. The Chinese Communist memorandum goes on to state that they did not capture the plane or the personnel on the plane and that they have no information concerning the personnel.

On the basis of the available evidence, the United States Government considers that the attack was made without warning; that it was unjustified; and that the responsibility for this loss of life and destruction of United States property lies with the Chinese Communist regime.

The United States Government will transmit through appropriate diplomatic channels the demand for damages for loss of life of the American crew members of the Navy patrol plane, as well as for the plane itself.

#### **CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BRITISH AND CHINESE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES**

Press release 465 dated September 1

*Text of Letter from British Chargé d'Affaires, Peiping, to Chinese Communist Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chang Han-fu, August 25*

You are no doubt aware that the United States authorities have announced that a United States Martin Mercator naval patrol aircraft on a routine flight from Japan was attacked by unidentified aircraft in the early hours of the 23rd of August in an area approximately 32 miles off the mainland

of China and 150 miles North of Formosa. According to the announcement the aircraft carried a crew of 4 officers and 12 enlisted men; it reported at 1:25 a.m. local time on the 23rd of August that it was under attack by aircraft, and after that, nothing more was heard from it.

I have been instructed by my Government, at the request of the United States Government, to enquire as a matter of urgency whether the Chinese authorities have any information on the fate of this aircraft and of any survivors from it. I shall be at your disposal at any time in order to receive from you any information on this matter which you may be able to give me.

*Text of Chinese Communist Reply, August 27*

Your letter of August 25, 1956 has been received. I have been instructed by my Government to reply as follows:

The Chinese Government does not have any information concerning the United States aircraft in the area mentioned in your letter, nor does it have any information concerning the personnel on the United States aircraft.

However, I would like to inform you of another event which was made public on the 23rd of August. After 0/00 hour<sup>1</sup> on August 23, a Chiang military plane was discovered over the sea south-east of Shanghai intruding over the Ma An Islands. Aircraft of the Chinese Air Force immediately took off. The Chiang plane continued to intrude over the Cheng Sze Islands and en-

countered our aircraft over the Huang Tse Shan Island, north of the Chushan Island, and having been hit and damaged by our aircraft it flew off immediately in the south-east direction. Our side did not capture that plane nor the personnel on the plane.

As is well-known, the war acts of harassment and destruction carried out by the military planes despatched by the Chiang Kai-shek clique to intrude over the mainland and the coastal islands have become even more frequent during the past year. Our Air Force has often fought with these Chiang military planes and shot them down, damaging them, or drove them away. As for this Chiang plane which intruded over the Ma An Islands, our Air Force took the same action and damaged it. It goes without saying that these Chiang planes are all aircraft of the United States type.

If the plane which intruded over the Ma An Islands, Cheng Sze Islands and Huang Tse Shan Island of China, turned out not to be a Chiang military plane but a United States naval aircraft, we could not but express great regret. If that should be the case, it also serves to prove that the manoeuvres of the Seventh Fleet of the United States Navy in the area from the Cheng Sze Islands to the Tachen Islands and the intrusion of a large number of their naval aircraft for reconnaissance over the Cheng Sze Islands on August 23 and 24 were planned provocation of violating China's territorial air and territorial sea. For this, the Chinese Government must express its serious protest against the United States Government.

Please accept the assurances of my respects.

<sup>1</sup> The British Embassy at Peiping confirmed from the Chinese Communist Foreign Office that this was midnight, August 22-23.



## The Foreign Service Institute: A Year in Review

by Harold B. Hoskins

The fiscal year which ended June 30, 1956, was one of the most active in the Foreign Service Institute's 10-year history. Figures tell part of the story of this activity. As many as 54 different courses were given on a round-the-calendar basis. Enrollment totaled 5,470—a slight increase over the previous year and 113 percent higher than in 1954. At the heart of the considerably revamped in-service training program were two new 3-month courses, one for newly appointed Foreign Service officers, the other for mature officers at the midway point in their careers. Each course was repeated several times with 15 to 25 trainees to a class. Intensive language instruction in 23 tongues was given to more than 800 students, by the simplified methods developed at the Institute.

As in the past, the largest group of Institute trainees consisted of those attending one of several types of part-time orientation courses. Ranging in duration from half a day to 3 weeks, these classes are designed to initiate new employees into the daily operations of U.S. Foreign Service posts abroad and to bring experienced officers up to date on current political and economic problems. Several courses were opened for the first time to wives and other members of officers' families. This experiment was especially well received; by preparing the wife to play a more helpful role in her husband's career, we are sure we have added strength to the Service.


Seminars on currently sensitive topics such as Communist Strategy, Peaceful Use of the Atom, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, each lasting from 1 to 7 weeks, were repeated several times for a total of more than 900 participants drawn from every Government department or agency interested in foreign affairs. Of note also was an experimental 1-week seminar on "The

American Scene," which was attended by 119 people and which covered recent developments in American science, economics, education, politics, literature, the theater, music, and art. Several new topics are in preparation, as we expect to expand our seminar program further this year.

Another feature of the Institute's curriculum was the introduction by a leading group of professional management consultants of the "case" method of training to Foreign Service groups gathered at a training center several miles from Washington. Under this system, discussion centers around a series of actual cases, each chosen to illustrate situations typical of those encountered in the Foreign Service. Under skilled discussion leaders, the spontaneous comments of experienced officers provide a powerful stimulant for further creative thinking. This is another type of training we expect to expand. Functional training of a more conventional nature was offered in Foreign Service administration and consular affairs to 58 selected employees.

Thanks to the Institute's location in Washington, we are able to augment our faculty with a wide variety of outside speakers. Outstanding officials from the Department and other agencies in Washington handled class discussions on foreign policy, nuclear weapons, intelligence, immigration, and

•Mr. Hoskins is Director of the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State. The Institute is an in-service training center for the U.S. Foreign Service, the Department, and other agencies of the Federal Government having responsibilities in the field of foreign relations.




Left: Students learning Hindi use a tape recorder to compare their pronunciation with that of their instructor. Below: A Foreign Service Institute student watches as a U.S. immigration official, aided by a translator, examines arrivals aboard the *Ile de France*.





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Right: A newly appointed Foreign Service officer, on a field trip, tours an Atomic Energy Commission laboratory. Below: Midcareer officers studying executive management discuss an actual problem faced by an Ambassador.



September 10, 1956

other subjects last year. In addition, professors have come from Pennsylvania, Northwestern, Chicago, Yale, Johns Hopkins, George Washington, and other universities to lecture for 1, 2, or 3 days at the Institute. Newspaper writers, business economists, labor leaders, a drama critic, and a poll-taker also have addressed our students.

#### Recent Improvements

The function of the Institute as stated by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which authorized its establishment, is "to furnish training and instruction to officers and employees of the Service and the Department, and to other officers and employees of the Government for whom training and instruction in the fields of foreign relations is necessary." In 1954 the Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel, under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry M. Wriston, former president of Brown University and now director of the American Assembly, undertook an exhaustive study of the U.S. Foreign Service. The committee's comments on the Institute's training program were as forthrightly critical as were those directed at recruitment methods and certain other operations of the Foreign Service. In the committee's opinion the Institute had failed to fulfill the purpose intended by the Congress, particularly in the field of advanced in-service training. Steps were taken promptly to revitalize the Institute along the lines the committee recommended, and last year the results began to show.

Today basic training is provided for all beginning officers and more courses to meet the specific needs of officers already in the Service are now being given. Our physical plant, a converted apartment house, has been improved. Present facilities are overcrowded, but we look ahead to the completion of the Department's greatly enlarged building, now authorized by the Congress, to remedy this situation.

Extremely important in developing the new program has been the support of the Secretary and other Department officials and the increased interest in training of various well-informed citizen groups such as the American Assembly, established by President Eisenhower when he was president of Columbia University; an *ad hoc* committee made up of members of the Council on Foreign Relations; and the Institute's own Advisory Committee.

Beginning with fiscal year 1956, the Department

asked for, and Congress approved, a larger budget for the Institute. The fiscal 1957, or current, budget figure is \$1.5 million larger than the previous year and as a result permits a still further expansion in training. We realize fully that to date only a start has been made and a great deal of important work still lies ahead. Further improvements will come in the content of our courses and in our teaching methods as we receive suggestions from the officers we have trained or from their superiors.

#### Career Training

Two years ago the Wriston Committee deplored what it termed "the Institute's pedestrian preoccupation with job mechanics." Last year we succeeded in placing the emphasis where it belongs—on career training.

The basic career course for junior officers, lasting 3 months full time, has been given 10 times since July 11, 1955, to a total of 191 newly appointed Foreign Service officers. It consists of two sections—Part I, foreign policy review and headquarters operations, and Part II, field work. Officers assigned to overseas posts complete both parts before they go abroad. Those assigned to the Department defer Part II until they are ready to report to the field. We estimate that as many as 400 new Foreign Service officers will be trained in 1956-57.

#### Present Apex

At present the apex of our career training program is the 3-month, full-time midcareer course, which a year ago was still in the planning stage. As of today the Institute has graduated three classes: the first class, 22 trainees, ended December 9; the second with 19, April 6; and the third, a group of 16, June 27. A fourth class of 18 enrolled July 9, and a new course will begin September 24 and every 3 months thereafter. We regard the first year's operation as a successful shakedown cruise. The "executive management" part of the course, offered for 1, and later for 2 weeks, will remain as the initial segment. The off-campus site has definite advantages: chiefly that students, faculty, and guest speakers, working and eating together in an informal atmosphere away from the distractions of Washington, readily develop the friendly interchange of ideas so essential to the mature learning process.

During the remainder of the midcareer course, the officers engage in a serious study of world affairs. Thought-provoking discussions are led by outstanding teachers such as F. S. C. Northrop, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Massimo Salvadori. This is no "ivory tower" learning. I have sat in the classroom on occasion and have come away impressed with the way in which our students enrich these discussions by relating theories of world affairs to practical examples from their own experience. There is no better method for developing an officer's potential capabilities to the full.

Wrote a former student from his new post:

The effect on me was residual rather than immediate. Each day, I see the application of the course to all the various aspects of my work and to all the rest of my life. It opens horizons I never knew existed.

On July 23, to meet a temporary need, we started a special 6-week program for Departmental officers taken into the Foreign Service under the integration program recommended by the Wriston Committee. Intensive instruction in post operations is the main theme; the sole text is *The Foreign Service Manual*, a series of volumes of regulations governing operations in the field. This course will be repeated at intervals so long as the Service requires it; then it will be discontinued.

#### The Institute—A Post

The Institute today has a professional faculty of 43 members, plus about 70 language tutors. Approximately two-thirds of the staff are Foreign Service officers. This fact makes the Institute itself a Foreign Service post of some importance. Heading the School of International Studies is Albert B. Franklin, whose last overseas assignment was Rangoon. James F. Grady was recalled from the Foreign Service Inspection Corps to organize the School of Management. Henry L. Smith, Jr., who is largely responsible for the methods and quality of language instruction at the Institute, has returned to the academic field after 10 years of service here, but there remains the organization he built with his assistant, Howard E. Sollenberger, in charge.

In the International Studies and Management Schools, courses and seminars are planned by faculty members, who then serve as course chairmen. Joseph J. Montllor, assisted by E. Jan Nadelman, is in charge of junior officer training.

#### Reference Material on the Foreign Service

The articles and pamphlets listed below contain material on the U.S. Foreign Service in general, with emphasis on recent developments affecting the Service, the opportunities it offers as a career, and the responsibilities which the Foreign Service Institute assists its students to meet.

"Understanding Our Foreign Service" by Ambassador John M. Cabot, BULLETIN of March 8, 1954, p. 353.

"The Reorganization of the American Foreign Service" by former Under Secretary Charles E. Saltzman, BULLETIN of September 27, 1954, p. 436.

"Amending the Foreign Service Act of 1946" by Deputy Under Secretary Loy W. Henderson, BULLETIN of March 7, 1955, p. 407.

"American Diplomacy at Work" by Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, BULLETIN of April 11, 1955, p. 616.

"The Foreign Service as a Career" by Deputy Under Secretary Henderson, BULLETIN of April 18, 1955, p. 635.

"The Department of State and the Quest for Quality" by Harold B. Hoskins, BULLETIN of May 16, 1955, p. 816.

"The Foreign Service—First Line of Defense" by Deputy Under Secretary Loy W. Henderson, BULLETIN of May 23, 1955, p. 849.

"U.S. Diplomacy in a Changing World" by Ambassador Willard L. Beaulac, BULLETIN of August 29, 1955, p. 335.

"Women in the Foreign Service: A Tribute to Ambassador Frances Willis" by Ambassador Donald R. Heath, BULLETIN of December 26, 1955, p. 1051.

"Tasks and Responsibilities of the Foreign Service" by Secretary Dulles, BULLETIN of April 9, 1956, p. 588.

*New Opportunities in the U.S. Foreign Service*, Department of State publication 5748, for sale by the U.S. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.—15 cents.

*When Americans Live Abroad*, Department of State publication 6340, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents—25 cents.

*The American Consul*, Department of State publication 5893, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents—10 cents.

*Sample Questions from the Foreign Service Officer Examination*, Department of State publication 5751, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents—15 cents.

Mr. Montllor's last post abroad was Phnom Penh; Mr. Nadelman was stationed at Palermo.

Robert Rossow, Jr., with a background of experience in India, Iran, and the Balkans, is chairman of the midcareer course. Alan M. G. Little, formerly of Harvard University, is in charge of



seminars; Norman K. Pratt, George Barraclough, and Perry H. Culley head various phases of management and orientation training.

Glen H. Fisher, a newly integrated officer and author of the Institute's new handbook, *When Americans Live Abroad*, has been a frequent discussion leader. Mrs. Monroe Williams Blake, an experienced Foreign Service wife, meets with wives and other dependents in a special section of the orientation course. Frequently called upon to supply subject matter for both orientation and career training are such other faculty authorities as Edwin M. Wright for the Middle East and Paul Sturm and Gregory Henderson for the Far East. Dr. Sturm also coordinates the assignment of trainees to colleges and universities.

During fiscal year 1956 the Institute assigned 64 selected Foreign Service officers of unusual promise to 13 colleges and universities in the United States and abroad. An additional 25 officers studied at the National War College and other colleges maintained by the Armed Forces. The Institute increased its general supervision of Foreign Service training in the field, including the advanced language study and area specialization given at its three branch schools in Japan, Taiwan, and Lebanon.

#### **Field Trip**

As Director of the Institute I had the pleasure during March and April of visiting our overseas branch schools in Tokyo, Taichung, and Beirut and of talking about training needs with chiefs of mission and their staffs in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Viet-Nam, Thailand, Burma, India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Germany, and France. I was impressed everywhere with the need for greater proficiency in the local language and, in many places, for better and more up-to-date materials for language instruction. We are now working on plans to improve the quality of the part-time language instruction in the field.

Many officers stationed abroad have expressed an interest in correspondence courses; 1956-57 will also see steps taken to offer a variety of courses by mail.

#### **The Advisory Committee Meets**

The Wriston Committee's report of 1954 referred to the Institute's original advisory group as "the Committee that never meets." This year

a new Advisory Committee, consisting of nine distinguished leaders from private and academic life, was organized. Its members are Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*; Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, House of Representatives; Ellsworth Bunker, President of the American National Red Cross; Robert D. Calkins, President of the Brookings Institution; Robert Cutler, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Old Colony Trust Company, Boston, Mass.; Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social Sciences, Harvard University; William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional Studies, Harvard University; Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Company, New York; Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.

Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson is chairman and three other Department officers sit "ex-officio"—Isaac W. Carpenter, Jr., Assistant Secretary-Controller; the Director General of the Foreign Service; and myself.

The Advisory Committee met for the first time on May 21 and again on June 26. A third meeting is scheduled for early fall. Of particular concern to the committee is the further development of a training program, including language instruction, for senior Foreign Service officers. Several committee members have been outspoken in their criticism of officers, particularly those with long experience in the Service, who neglect to master at least one foreign language. In answer to the question "Would you recommend dismissal of an otherwise brilliant officer who had failed to learn a language?" one adviser replied he would scarcely consider an officer "brilliant" who did not know one "world" language or who had not attempted to learn the language of at least one of the countries where he had been stationed.

#### **Need for Language Specialists**

Another phase of the language problem in the Foreign Service is the need for increasing the number of language-and-area specialists. I am referring now not to officers who are able to converse in one or more languages but to those who really know a language well enough to use it in diplomatic negotiations. In 10 years the Institute has trained 222 language-and-area experts. Of this number, 29 have left the Service through resignation, retirement, or death. Thus 193 Institute-trained language officers remain in the

Service, besides many others who have acquired language fluency by other means.

To date our "specialist" program has concentrated on the Iron Curtain countries and on the Near and Far East, where our immediate needs have been most acute. According to a recent survey, our Service is still some 300 short of the required language-and-area specialists; however, to help fill this gap, 65 officers are now in training at the Foreign Service Institute, at universities, or at FSI branches in the field. At our present rate of training, it will take about 5 years to reach our goal. Then, once the gap is closed, we can plan a program aimed at taking care of replacements.

### **Beyond the Water's Edge**

During the past year we have discussed our training problems with many groups of citizens. We found common agreement on the need for improved training. All felt that the American Government needed the best trained Foreign Service no matter what party may be in power.

"The Representation of the United States Abroad" was the topic of the Ninth American Assembly held at Harriman, N. Y., during May. Among the participants were Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, former Ambassador to Denmark; Morehead Patterson, chairman of the American Machine and Foundry Company; Philip D. Reed, chairman of the board of the General Electric Company; Quincy Wright, professor of international law, University of Chicago; Howland H. Sargent, president, American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism; and Shepard Stone, Ford Foundation. One of the recommendations made by this distinguished group of participants was the following:

Improved recruitment, career planning, and in-service training are essential for all overseas operations. The number of career officers should be increased to the extent necessary to permit orderly rotation and periodic assignment for advanced training on a basis analogous to that of the armed services. In-service training of civilian overseas personnel for all agencies should be provided by an expanded and more highly developed Foreign Service Institute, making full use of universities, colleges, and other facilities.

### **Three Goals To Go**

Next year, March 13, 1957, the Foreign Service Institute will be 10 years old. As I indicated earlier, three serious gaps in the training program

remain. There is need to (1) increase opportunities for advanced training in the diplomatic service; (2) improve the language abilities of all our officers; and (3) bring our corps of language-and-area experts up to full strength as quickly as possible.

With the continued support of the Congress, the Secretary, and other officials in the Department, our training program for 1956-57 is aimed at making further advances toward an even better trained Foreign Service of the United States.

## **Department's Opposition to Proposed Great Lakes Basin Compact**

*Statement by Willard B. Cowles  
Deputy Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>*

In S. 2688 the consent and approval of Congress is sought to permit the States bordering on the Great Lakes "to enter into" a compact known as the Great Lakes Basin Compact, the substance of which is set out in section 1 of the bill. The Congress is further requested in the bill to give its consent to these States to enter into such a compact with the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.

As defined in the compact, the Great Lakes Basin extends nearly half way across the boundary between the United States and Canada. The basin area would consist of the Canadian as well as the American portion of the lakes, and the Canadian watershed as well as the watershed of the United States. The United States part of the Great Lakes watershed covers approximately 172,000 square miles. The total watershed area in both countries, including the surface water of the lakes themselves, is nearly 300,000 square miles.

The purposes of the compact, as stated in its article I, are:

1. To promote the orderly, integrated, and comprehensive development, use, and conservation of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin. . . .
2. To plan for the welfare and development of the water resources of the Basin as a whole as well as for those portions of the Basin which may have problems of special concern.
3. To make it possible for the states of the Basin and their people to derive the maximum benefit from utilization of public works, in the form of navigational aids or

<sup>1</sup> Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 27.

otherwise, which may exist or which may be constructed from time to time.

4. To advise in securing and maintaining a proper balance among industrial, commercial, agricultural, water supply, residential, recreational, and other legitimate uses of the water resources of the Basin.

According to the compact (article VII) a commission to be established anticipates interesting itself in and taking action upon such subjects as stabilization of lake levels; pollution, beach erosion, floods, and shore inundation; State navigational aids and improvements; parasitical forces endangering the fisheries and wildlife; hydro-electric power developments; soil and bank erosion; diversion of waters; as well as "other measures the Commission may recommend to the states" pursuant to its delegated powers. This list gives but a partial picture of the vastness of the scope and activities contemplated under the compact.

As a matter of principle, the Department would oppose any interstate compact which affects foreign relations unless there is a showing of a specific local situation appropriate for handling by the local authorities. Here there is no such local situation. The matter is of national interest and clearly involves foreign relations in a field traditionally handled by the Department of State, acting for the President. Hence, we oppose this bill in principle. Beginning on May 15 last, and on several occasions since then, representatives of the Department of State have explained the Department's views at length to some of the principal sponsors of the proposed compact and have expressed its willingness to review and comment on any new draft they may put forward.

#### Language of Constitution

The compact proposes to establish and maintain an "intergovernmental agency"—the Great Lakes Commission—which would be an international, intergovernmental organization with powers and functions concerning this region of the United States and of Canada. The "powers" to be granted by the compact to the commission are specific and far reaching. Article VI of the compact sets out a series of "powers" which take up nearly two and a half pages of the bill. This list appears under the heading, "The Commission shall have power to . . ."—which is the same language as used in the Constitution of the United

States in delegating to Congress its legislative powers.

Again like the Constitution of the United States, the compact has a "necessary and proper" clause. It provides that the commission may "do all things necessary and proper to carry out the powers conferred upon the Commission by this compact, provided that no action of the Commission shall have the force of law in, or be binding upon, any party state." Nothing is said in the compact as to the effect the exercise of its powers might have on the treaty making power, on other Federal powers, or on Federal law generally.

All that the Constitution anticipates of the Congress in respect of compacts is that it give or withhold its consent. Section 1 of this bill states not only that the Congress consents to the compact but also that it approves of these States entering into a compact with the substance of the present one. In section 2 of the bill it is stated that it is the purpose of Congress that the United States Government "shall assist" in the furtherance of the objectives of a Great Lakes Basin Compact and in the work of the commission created thereby. Section 2 also stipulates that "all officers, agencies, departments, and persons of and in the United States Government shall cooperate with the Great Lakes Commission . . . in any manner authorized by law other than this Act."

Unlike some other compact-consenting legislation, this bill contains no provision to the general effect that nothing therein shall be construed so as to impair or affect any power or right of the United States. The compact deals largely with matters heretofore and now included in international treaties, but it does not require the proposed commission to cooperate with and assist Federal agencies or even so much as to consult with them. Instead of requiring the proposed commission to cooperate and assist the United States Government with these international problems, section 2 of the bill would make it mandatory upon all officers, agencies, departments, and persons in the United States Government to "assist" and "cooperate" with the commission.

Specific congressional approval of the compact (which presumably is intended to mean the substance of the present compact), together with the mandatory order that all officers, agencies, departments, and persons of and in the United States Government shall "assist" the commission is strong



language. The word "cooperate" is also a broad term. We are not clear just what it would include, but article IX states that it is intended that the provisions of the compact shall be "liberally" construed. If the commission can "recommend" and the Department must "assist" in a cooperative manner, it is not at all clear how the Secretary of State could instruct our ambassador or consuls in Canada otherwise than in accordance with the decisions of the commission. Moreover, should the Congress pass this bill giving its "approval" in addition to its "consent," it would seem to emphasize a congressional decision to subordinate the Federal Government to these States in this large and important area of international activity.

Once started, the commission could legally continue to function with only one State and one Canadian Province as parties. If this compact were approved and if one or more Canadian Provinces were a party to it, it might be difficult, as a practical matter, to abolish or change such an established international institution. Apart from section 3 of the bill, the termination of the commission would be wholly within the control of the States parties thereto.

#### **Proposed Powers**

A few items on the compact's list of proposed powers are of special interest:

*First:* The commission would be empowered not only to deal with Canadian provincial governments but also to deal directly with the Canadian Government at Ottawa. Moreover, the commission would be empowered to deal with other foreign governments.

The commission could also recommend to foreign governments and to international bodies "uniform or other laws, ordinances, or regulations," and this could apparently be done without in any wise consulting the Federal Government. Even if no Canadian Provinces should come into the organization, the commission could "cooperate" with both the Canadian Government and with such public agencies or bodies as have "interests in or jurisdiction sufficient to affect the Basin or any portion thereof." There is no suggestion that any such activities are to be conducted through the Department of State or any other department or agency of the Federal Government.

*Second:* The commission would also be em-

powered to deal directly with "intergovernmental bodies." The principal "intergovernmental bodies" having jurisdiction over Great Lakes matters are the International Joint Commission, under a treaty of 1909, and the new Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, established by the convention signed September 10, 1954. These American-Canadian international organizations are already authorized to deal with many of the very matters contemplated in the proposed compact.

*Third:* The commission, on its own initiative, would be empowered to "recommend agreements between the Governments of the United States and Canada." Inasmuch as the commission would also be empowered to "do all things necessary and proper" to carry out the powers conferred upon it, it could draft position papers and international treaties and, with apparent congressional sanction, press the Department of State to "assist" in a cooperative manner in obtaining Canadian acceptance of them.

*Fourth:* If, as planned, one or more Canadian Provinces become a party, the commission would also be empowered "at the request of the Government of Canada" alone to "assist" in the negotiation and formulation of any relevant treaty or other mutual arrangement or agreement between the United States and Canada. When under this provision the commission "assisted" in the formulation of treaties, United States officials might likewise be called on to "cooperate" with and to "assist" the commission.

In the light of such things as these on the face of the compact it cannot be regarded as merely a body to gather information and make recommendations. This commission would be empowered to concern itself with practically every international problem which might arise between the United States and Canada in this large basin area. Most of the specific subjects proposed to be dealt with by the commission have been the subject of negotiation and agreement between the United States and Canada. Many, if not most, of these subjects are essentially international in character and have traditionally been regarded as national in scope—not regional. It need hardly be remarked to this committee that the Constitution has delegated authority to the Federal Government to deal internationally with matters of national concern.

It is a basic policy of the Department of State that all States concerned be consulted and heard

with regard to international negotiations on matters which involve their interests. This is a long-established practice. The present system has worked well since the adoption of the Constitution, and still does.

The Congress is being asked to give the commission a status unprecedented in the history of American foreign relations—a status in a large area of American-Canadian relations to which the Federal Government would be subordinate. The compact sets out a highly formal system clearly involving many political matters. It goes much farther than ever attempted by any other compact. In an already complex Federal system, the compact proposes to set up a new layer of government with powers in an international area. The proposal is for an international compact, not for an interstate compact. This is not the sort of activity which was intended to be covered by the compact provision of the Constitution. Matters of international negotiation and agreement should be under national control as the Constitution contemplates and requires. With congressional approval this proposal might well be used as a precedent for many other incursions upon the basic principles and powers of the National Government in foreign affairs.

In short, we doubt the need for any such organization. No need to change the present system is shown. If the commission existed, it would at best have great potentialities for creating confusion in American-Canadian relations and might well involve duplication of work.

I want to make it clear to the committee that the Department is not opposed to interstate compacts as such. Although we question the need for additional organizational machinery, if the States involved wish to be more closely associated in their consideration of Great Lakes Basin problems the objections of the Department of State could be met by confining such a compact to study and recommendation. We do not believe, however, that a mere change of a word or phrase here or there in the present compact would achieve this result. In our view it is not a matter of patching cracks but of basic concept and approach. I am sure that it was not the intention to place a region of the country in a position where it might override the Federal Government in the field of international relations, but, in the Department's view, this is nevertheless the effect of S. 2688 as it now stands.

## Resumption of Nuclear Tests by Soviet Union

White House press release dated August 26 (Cypress Point, Calif.)

The President made public today the attached statement by Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, announcing the resumption by the Soviets of tests of nuclear weapons. This is the thirteenth announcement to the world by the U.S. Government of nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

In releasing the statement, the President said:

I wish again to emphasize the necessity for effective international control of atomic energy and such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible. This is a goal which the United States has consistently sought and which has received the support of a large majority of the members of the United Nations.

Chairman Strauss' statement is being made public in accordance with the President's policy of keeping the American people informed to the fullest practical extent of important developments at home and abroad concerning nuclear weapons.

### STATEMENT BY AEC CHAIRMAN STRAUSS

The Soviet Union has resumed its testing of nuclear weapons and on August 24, 1956, detonated a nuclear device with a yield less than a megaton at the usual Soviet proving ground. This proving ground, where most of the Soviet tests have occurred, is located in southwest Siberia, north of India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and west of China. In addition to this area, the Soviets have also utilized the area of the Barents Sea for nuclear testing.

This is the thirteenth announcement by the United States concerning nuclear weapons tests by the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union has never given the world any assurances with respect to the way in which it conducts nuclear weapons tests and has, in fact, never made an advance announcement of any of its detonations or test series. Only three times has the Soviet made any statements about its weapons tests and then has but briefly acknowledged that a

<sup>1</sup> At his news conference on Aug. 31 the President announced that a second explosion had taken place in Siberia the previous morning. On Sept. 3 the Atomic Energy Commission announced that a third explosion in the current test series had occurred on Sept. 2 "in the same region and the same range of size as the two previous bursts."

test has taken place. Two of these three statements have followed the United States announcements.

The secrecy of the Soviet weapons test program, which has been most actively pursued for the past 7 years, contrasts with the responsible public information policy of our Government with respect to the United States test program. All test programs by our country have been announced well in advance, and public information has been made available about them to the fullest extent consistent with security. Two detonations of the recent test series at Eniwetok were witnessed by representatives of the United States press, radio, and television so that they could report to the world regarding the way in which United States tests are carried on. Representatives of United States and foreign news media also have witnessed "open shots" of weapons tests at the Nevada Proving Ground.

At first hand to these newsmen and to the public in general by this and many other means, this Government has supplied detailed information about the conduct of the United States tests—information about the careful scheduling of detonations at optimum times for the safest weather conditions, the limiting of test activities to a specified warning area, the continuous surveillance of this area to protect shipping, and the performance of frequent radiological surveys of the surrounding areas.

The recently concluded series at Eniwetok, which began in May 1956, was announced on January 12, 1956. The location and exact boundaries of the warning area were announced April 20. Conclusion of the series was stated July 23 and the end of need for the warning area announced on August 11.

The United States regards the safety and public

health measures that it takes as an essential to properly conducted nuclear tests.

The record of United States announcements gives clear evidence that the Soviet's nuclear weapons testing activity has been on a steadily increasing scale since 1949. Such announcements, prior to today's, were as follows:

1949: September 23  
 1951: October 3  
       October 22  
 1953: August 20  
       August 31 (one of a series of explosions)  
 1954: October 26 (one of a series of explosions)  
 1955: August 4  
       September 24 (one of a series of explosions)  
       November 10 (one of a series of explosions)  
       November 23  
 1956: March 21  
       April 2 (one of a series of explosions)

Although there have been but thirteen announcements by the United States regarding Soviet testing, several have noted a series of detonations and the actual number of Soviet detonations is significantly higher than thirteen. As indicated in several of the United States announcements, this country does not disclose all of the U.S.S.R. shots of which it has knowledge but limits itself to statements about explosions of special interest because of their large size, their series character, or some other unusual fact. For example, the United States stated on November 23, 1955, that the explosion then announced was "the largest thus far in the U.S.S.R., and was in the range of megatons."<sup>2</sup> This was later confirmed by Mr. Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Communist Party, when he stated in Bangalore, India, on November 26, 1955, that this Soviet explosion was of "unprecedented might."

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 916.

### Annex

*Following is a compilation of statements by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on nuclear weapons, including all statements by both countries regarding Soviet weapons testing activities.*

Date	U.S. Statement	U.S.S.R. Statement
6 November 1947 . . . . .		Molotov: "The 'secret' of the atom bomb has long ceased to exist."
1 October 1948 . . . . .		Vishinsky: "It is a mistake to think there is just one state which has a monopoly over atomic energy and the atomic bomb."

<i>Date</i>	<i>U.S. Statement</i>	<i>U.S.S.R. Statement</i>
23 September 1949 . . .	President Truman: "We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R."	
24 September 1949 . . .		TASS: "Despite the existence in its country of an atomic weapon, the Soviet government would continue to demand absolute prohibition of the use of atomic weapons."
3 October 1951 . . .	President Truman: "Another atomic bomb has recently been exploded within the Soviet Union. In spite of Soviet pretensions that their atomic-energy program is being directed exclusively toward peaceful purposes, this event confirms again that the Soviet Union is continuing to make atomic weapons."	
6 October 1951 . . .		Stalin in <i>Pravda</i> : "Indeed, one of the types of atomic bombs was recently tested in our country. Tests of atomic bombs of different calibers will be conducted in the future as well, in accord with the plan for defense of our country from attack by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc."
22 October 1951 . . .	President Truman: "Another atomic explosion has occurred within the Soviet Union apparently as a part of a test series. Of course, there may be more such explosions from time to time."	
8 August 1953 . . .		Malenkov: Told the Supreme Soviet that the U.S. had no "monopoly" on the hydrogen bomb. "The U.S. . . has long since lost the monopoly in the matter of the production of atomic bombs. . . . The government deems it necessary to report to the Supreme Soviet the U.S. has no monopoly in the production of the hydrogen bomb either."
8 August 1953 . . .	In reply to Malenkov, Chairman Strauss says: "We have never assumed that it was beyond the capability of the Russians to produce such a weapon and that is the reason why, more than 3 years ago, it was decided to press forward with this development for ourselves."	
20 August 1953 . . .	Chairman Strauss: "The Soviet Union conducted an atomic test on the morning of August 12. Certain information to this effect came into our hands that night. Subsequent information on the subject indicates that this test involved both fission and thermonuclear reactions."	<i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestia</i> : "One of a variety of hydrogen bombs was exploded for experimental purposes in the Soviet Union within the past few days. Because a powerful thermonuclear reaction was created in the hydrogen bomb, the explosion was of great strength. The tests showed that the power of the hydrogen bomb is many times greater than the power of the atom bomb. It is known that the Soviet Union has had the atomic weapon for several years and has conducted suitable tests."

<i>Date</i>	<i>U.S. Statement</i>	<i>U.S.S.R. Statement</i>
31 August 1953. . . .	AEC issued the following statement: "On August 23, 1953, a fission explosion took place in Russian territory. . . . The explosion was in the same range of energy release as our Nevada tests and would appear to be part of a series. If this proves to be the fact, no further announcements will be made unless intelligence indicates information of greater interest."	
18 September 1953 . . . . .		TASS announcement concerning test of new types of atomic bombs in the Soviet Union: In recent weeks, in accord with the plan of scientific research work in the field of atomic energy in the Soviet Union, tests have been held of several types of atomic bombs. Tests were successful.
26 October 1954. . . .	Chairman, AEC, stated that "there had been a series of detonations of nuclear explosives in Soviet territory. This series began in mid-September and has continued at intervals to the present. Further announcement concerning this series will be made only if some unusual development would appear to warrant it. As is generally the case with nuclear detonations, these tests have resulted in some widespread fall-out of radioactive material, but insignificantly in the United States.	
4 August 1955 . . . .	AEC announcement: "Within the past few days the Soviets have resumed testing of nuclear weapons. This may mean the beginning of a new test series."	
24 September 1955 . .	Chairman Strauss stated that another Soviet nuclear explosion had occurred in recent days, indicating a continuation of their tests of nuclear weapons. Further announcements concerning the Soviet test series will be made only if some information of particular interest develops.	
10 November 1955 . .	Chairman Strauss announced today that the Soviet Union has, in recent days, conducted a further nuclear test in their 1955 series.	
23 November 1955 . .	Chairman Strauss announced today that another explosion had taken place in the current Soviet test series. Following the policy of reporting to the American people information of significance concerning Soviet weapons tests, Mr. Strauss said that this explosion was the largest thus far in the U.S.S.R. and was in the range of megatons. The Russian tests indicate an increasingly intensive effort by the Soviet Government to develop their nuclear weapons potential.	



<i>Date</i>	<i>U.S. Statement</i>	<i>U.S.S.R. Statement</i>
26 November 1955 . . . . .		Khrushchev in Bangalore, India, announced that the Soviets had just set off a nuclear weapon of "unprecedented might" and involving a new method of explosion. He gave assurance that although this new weapon was intended to "influence the nerves of those who would like to unleash a new war," the Soviets would never be the first to use "this new power."
29 December 1955 . . . . .		Khrushchev before Supreme Soviet recalled the results of the recent Soviet tests of the latest hydrogen bomb; he declared that it had the power of many million tons of usual explosives and that it can be substantially increased.
21 January 1956 . . . . .		Marshal V. I. Chuykov (Commander, Kiev Military District) stated: "U.S.A. monopoly of atomic weapons long since liquidated, and Soviet Union has surpassed United States in hydrogen weapons." Remark made in speech on foreign relations at Ukrainian Party Congress which closed 21 January 1956.
21 March 1956 . . . . .	Chairman Strauss: "Within the past few days the Soviets have exploded another nuclear device. . . . This is the fifth United States announcement of Soviet nuclear weapon tests in the past 8 months."	
2 April 1956 . . . . .	Chairman Strauss announced today that "the Soviet Union in recent days has conducted another nuclear test in their current series. This is the sixth United States announcement of Soviet weapons tests in the past 8 months.	
13 April 1956 . . . . .		I. G. Kabanov, Minister of Foreign Trade, in Geneva before Economic Commission for Europe: ". . . of course, we do not conceal the fact that in the event we are compelled to use it (atomic energy) for military purposes, we shall not hesitate to use it for military purposes."
23 April 1956 . . . . .		Khrushchev, Soviet Communist Party Chief (in London): "It remains a fact that we were the first to explode an H-bomb from an airplane . . . Great stress is being laid now on guided missiles . . . I am quite sure that we will have the guided missile with an H-bomb warhead which can land anywhere in the world."



## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

#### International Geological Congress

The Department of State announced on August 24 (press release 445) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the 20th Session of the International Geological Congress to be held at Mexico City on September 4-11:

Felix Edgar Wormser, *Chairman*, Assistant Secretary for Mineral Resources, Department of the Interior

William D. Johnston, Jr., *Secretary*, Chief, Foreign Geological Branch, United States Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

Francis Cameron, President, Society of Economic Geologists, New York, N. Y.

A. Rodger Denison, Vice President, Amerada Petroleum Corporation, Tulsa, Okla.

Joseph L. Gillson, Vice President, American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers, Wilmington, Del.

Harry H. Hess, Member of the National Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the Division of Earth Sciences of the Academy-Research Council, Princeton, N. J.

Morris M. Leighton, President, American Geological Institute, Urbana, Ill.

Thomas S. Lovering, Chief, Geochemical Exploration Section, United States Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

Thomas H. Miller, Acting Director, United States Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior

Henryk B. Stenzel, President of the Paleontological Society, Houston, Tex.

This series of congresses was initiated at Buffalo, N.Y., in 1876 for the purpose of advancing investigations with respect to the study of the earth. The congresses, which meet every 3 or 4 years, serve to bring together the principal geologists of the world and offer forums for the discussion of many aspects of geology. In addition to a 15-item agenda on technical geological topics, the 20th Session has designated as studies of special interests (1) symposium on oil and gas deposits, and (2) symposium on manganese deposits.

The 19th Congress, held at Algiers in Septem-

ber 1952, was attended by approximately 1,000 geologists and other scientists from 60 countries and territories.

#### International Civil Aviation Organization

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will convene a Joint Financing Conference To Revise the Danish and Icelandic Agreements at Geneva, Switzerland, on September 6, 1956. The Department of State announced on August 29 (press release 453) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation:

##### United States Representative

Claude H. Smith, Chief ICAO Officer, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

##### Alternate United States Representatives

Sidney S. Cummins, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

E. V. Shores, Airways Operations Specialist, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

##### Advisers

H. Grady Gatlin, Air Transport Association of America, Inc., Washington, D. C.

William C. Hannemann, Air Coordinating Committee Liaison Officer, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

William J. McKnight, Collins Radio Company, Washington, D. C.

Harold R. Sanderson, Assistant Chief, Routes and Carrier Relations Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Ben Taylor, Lt. Col., USAF, Staff Planning Officer, Directorate of Plans, Department of the Air Force

The conference is expected to develop one or more international agreements covering the joint support of air-navigation services in Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland.

The purpose of the conference is to review the developments and administration of the Icelandic and Danish air-navigation service arrangements and to review the facilities and services currently furnished. The six items on the agenda include financial principles and administrative procedures to be followed under the new arrangements. Questions of the possible introduction of charges on aircraft operators using the services, the need for retaining the existing services under joint support, and possible inclusion of new services are also to be considered.

The U.S. Government is one of the major users of and contributors to the air-navigation services (weather-observation stations, communications fa-

cilities, and radio aids) provided under the existing agreements.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.<sup>1</sup>  
*Adherence deposited:* Nicaragua, August 2, 1956.

##### Death, Causes of

Additional regulations amending the nomenclature regulations, 1948 (World Health Organization Regulations No. 1 regarding nomenclature, including the compilation and publication of statistics with respect to diseases and causes of death (TIAS 3482)). Adopted at Geneva May 21, 1956. Will enter into force January 1, 1958.

##### Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.

*Associate members admitted:* Gold Coast, Federation of Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, May 9, 1956.

##### International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).

*Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited (with an exception):* Netherlands, August 1, 1956 (effective August 6, 1956).<sup>2</sup>

##### Japan

Treaty of Peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951. Entered into force April 28, 1952. TIAS 2490.

*Ratification deposited:* Iran, August 29, 1956.

##### Postal Services

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.

*Ratifications deposited:* Portuguese territories of West Africa, East Africa, Asia, and Africa, June 27, 1956; Philippines, August 2, 1956.

*Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of extension to:* Land Berlin (effective date to be the same as that for the Federal Republic, i. e. March 21, 1955).

#### Trade and Commerce

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Opened for signature at Geneva November 8, 1952.<sup>3</sup>

*Signature:* Peru, August 23, 1956.

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva October 24, 1953.<sup>4</sup>

*Signature:* Peru, August 23, 1956.

Fifth protocol of rectification and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>5</sup>

*Signature:* Norway, August 16, 1956.

#### War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war. Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365.

*Adherence deposited:* Morocco, July 26, 1956.

#### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1956. Open for signature at Washington through May 18, 1956.

*Accession deposited:* Cuba, July 23, 1956.

#### BILATERAL

##### Netherlands

Agreement for establishment and operation of rawinsonde observation stations in Curaçao and St. Martin. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague August 6 and 16, 1956. Enters into force on date an arrangement embodying the technical details is signed by the co-operating agencies of the two Governments.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Declaration of August 5, 1946, accepting as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, is terminated with effect from August 6, 1956.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force.

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### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 27-September 2

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to August 27 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 445 of August 24.

No.	Date	Subject
†447	8/27	Reception center at Seattle.
*448	8/28	Allen sworn in as Ambassador to Greece.
*449	8/28	Delegation to Ecuadoran inauguration.
450	8/28	Dulles: news conference.
*451	8/29	Rountree sworn in as Assistant Secretary.
†452	8/29	Berry named Deputy Assistant Secretary (rewrite).
453	8/29	Delegation to ICAO conference.
†454	8/29	Commodity agreement with India.
*455	8/30	Hare sworn in as Ambassador to Egypt.
456	8/30	Senator George departs for Europe.
*457	8/30	Jones sworn in as Ambassador to Tunisia.
*458	8/30	Cannon sworn in as Ambassador to Morocco.
†459	8/30	Visit of French parliamentary group.
460	8/30	Costa Rica credentials (rewrite).
*461	8/30	Dulles: death of Ambassador Moffat.
462	8/31	Sudan credentials (rewrite).
†463	8/31	Delegation to ILO conference.
464	8/31	Joint State-Defense statement on loss of Navy plane.
465	9/1	Texts of British letter to Chinese Communists and reply.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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1. The admission of 16 new members, enlarging U.N. membership from 60 to 76 countries.

2. The endorsement of further steps toward the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency and the recommendation for a second international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

3. The decision to give priority in U.N. disarmament talks to confidence-building measures, including President Eisenhower's proposal of mutual aerial inspection and Marshal Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers, as well as all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are feasible.

4. The progress made toward early establishment of the International Finance Corporation.

5. The decision to explore the organization of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

6. The Assembly approval of a Charter Review Conference "at an appropriate time," the date and place to be fixed at a subsequent session of the Assembly.

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